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NOTES
GARAGE DOOR OPENERS AND TONER
CARTRIDGES: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD
REVISIT THE ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION
PROVISIONS OF THE DMCA
HEATHER A. SAPPt

Technology drives innovation, both in the marketplace and in the law.
Copyright law, in particular, is driven by technological change, as each
major overhaul of the Copyright Act' has been the result of advances in
technology disturbing the equilibrium between the rights of authors and the
dissemination of expression to the general public.2 In fact, the latest major
enactment of copyright law was driven by increased usage of the Internet
and emerging digital media and the impact3 these new technologies would
have on the ease of pirating creative works.
Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 4 to
"ensure a thriving electronic marketplace for copyrighted works on the
Internet." 5 The centerpiece of this sweeping legislation is a prohibition on
t LL.M. in Intellectual Property, The George Washington University Law School,
2005; JD, The College of Law at Arizona State University, 2004; AB in Political Science
and French & European Studies, Duke University, 1999. Ms. Sapp is currently an attorney
with the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office. The views expressed in this article are those of the
author and in no way reflect the policy of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office or the U.S.
Government. The author thanks Robert Kasunic, Dennis Kajala, and the Honorable Ralph
Oman for their insights, comments, and suggestions on an earlier draft. She also thanks her
husband, Eric Chen, for his love and support.
The copyright law of the United States is contained in Title 17 of the United States
Code, chapters 1 through 9 and 10 through 13. The Copyright Act of 1976, which provides
the basic framework for the current copyright law, was enacted on October 19, 1976 and has
been amended several times.
2 See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE

CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (1994); see also Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L.
REv. 1095, 1097 (2003).
3 See Peter S. Menell, EnvisioningCopyright Law's DigitalFuture,46 N.Y. L. SCH. L.
REv. 63, 133-34 (2003).
4 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, Title I, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (amending §§ 108, 112, 114, & 117, chapters 7 and 8; adding new chapters and 13,
and a new §512.).
5 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, at 9 (1998). One commentator points out, however, that
"although the legislative history refers repeatedly to the 'Internet,' it is noteworthy, for a law
designated to confront head-on the emigration of works of authorship from their traditional
domains to the new-fangled world of cyberspace, that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
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the circumvention of technological measures that control access to
copyrighted works. 6 However, the DMCA's language is not limited to
situations involving the distribution of underlying copyrighted works with
an independent economic significance through means of the Internet and
digital media.7 As a result, the DMCA also applies in many situations not
contemplated by its drafters.8 In particular, the plain meaning of statute's
anti-circumvention provisions 9 suggests that it is germane to situations
other than digital piracy of creative works and may be used to extend
copyright protection to functional applications traditionally protected by
patent, such as the durable goods replacement part markets.' 0
Part I of this paper discusses the rationale behind the DMCA, provides
a history of its enactment, and analyzes some previous case law interpreting
the anti-circumvention provisions in the context of digital piracy. Part II
analyzes two cases that inconsistently apply the anti-circumvention
provisions to functional applications of copyrighted software embedded in
durable goods. Finally, Part III discusses the legislative intent behind the
DMCA, examines the copyright misuse doctrine, and concludes that
Congress should revisit the Act to stop courts from being forced to arrive at
decisions that restrain competition in aftermarkets for functional, durable
goods.
I.
THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT

The DMCA, hailed by supporters and widely criticized by detractors,
is the most significant development in copyright law of the past decade."
Among its sweeping changes, the legislation added a new Chapter 12 to the
Copyright Act. This new chapter, entitled "Copyright Protection and
Management Systems," makes it a violation, among other things, to
circumvent copyright protection systems or to traffic in devices designed to
as a whole contains only three instances of that word." David Nimmer, Appreciating
Legislative History: The Sweet andSour Spots of the DMCA 's Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L.
REv. 909, 916 (2002) [hereinafter Nimmer, Sweet and Sour].
6 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (1998). These provisions, commonly referred to as the
"anti-circumvention provisions," are also known as the "black box" provisions. See Nimmer,
Sweet and Sour, supra note 5, at 915.
' See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1998).
8 See generally Daniel C. Higgs, Note, Lexmark International,Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc. & Chamberlain Group, Inc., v. Skylink Technologies,Inc.: The DMCA and
Durable Goods Aftermarkets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 59 (2004); Natalie Bajalcaliev, Note,
Lexmark International,Inc. v. Static Control Components: Enjoining Proper Usage of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act's Anti-Circumvention Provisions,5 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 101
(2003).
9 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1998).
1oSee generally Higgs, supra note 8.
11See Nimmer, Sweet and Sour, supra note 5, at 912.
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A. The DMCA's anti-circumventionprovisions

In 1996, in part due to the efforts of the collective lobbying juggernaut
of the American and European content industry 1 3 and the efforts of the U.S.
and European governments at the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), 14 WIPO adopted, and the member-states ratified, two new internet
treaties-the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty.1 5 The treaties obligated member states to provide:
...adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the
circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by
authors in connection with the exercise of their rights.. .and that restrict
acts, in respect of their works, which
are not authorized by the authors
16
concerned or permitted by law.
Generally, U.S. copyright laws already complied with the terms of the
WIPO treaties' obligations. However, some modifications were necessary
to comply with the new standards.1 7 Although some scholars argue that
U.S. law already provided adequate protection against digital piracy
sufficient to meet the general norms of the WIPO treaties,1 8 copyright
9
holders lobbied Congress for stronger language and greater protection.
In response to the treaties and the content industry's desire for greater
1217 U.S.C. §1201(a) (1998).
13 The

phrases "content industry" or "content industries," as discussed in this paper,
are used to refer collectively to those who create, produce, manage, or distribute art, such as
Hollywood, the recording industry, songwriters, performers, dancers, the television
production industry, the publishing industry, novelists, sculptors, graphic artists, etc.
14See David Nimmer, Time and Space, 38 IDEA 501, 508-510 (1998) [hereinafter
Nimmer, Time and Space] (noting the disproportionate impact played by U.S. lobbying
efforts at the 1996 WIPO conference in Geneva); Higgs, supra note 8, at 61-62; see also
World Intellectual Prop. Org., Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and
Neighboring Rights Questions: List of Participants 55-66 (1996), available at
http://www.wipo.int./documents/en/diplconf/distrib/pdf/inf2.pdf.
IS
WIPO
Copyright
Treaty,
Dec.
20,
1996,
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo033en.htin; WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, available at http://www.wipo.int./clea/docsnew/en/wo034en.htm.
For background on the treaties, see David Nimmer, A Tale of Two Treaties: Dateline:
Geneva - December 1996, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1997) [hereinafter Nimmer, Two
Treaties].
16 WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 11; see also WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, art. 18.
17 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the "Digital Millennium, " 23
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137 (1999).

18See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the DigitalEconomy: Why
the Anti-circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 53034 (1999).
19See Nimmer, Sweet and Sour, supra note 5, at 916; see also Higgs, supra note 8, at
62; Samuelson, supra note 18, at 533-34.
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protection, Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998.20 Congress' stated
rationale for passing the legislation was to "facilitate the robust
development and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce,
communications, research, development, and education in the digital age.'
The DMCA creates an unprecedented set of rights wholly separate
from traditional copyright. 22 The new anti-circumvention rights, referred to
by some commentators as "paracopyright, ' 23 "allow control of
uncopyrighted materials, and confer upon content owners a new exclusive
right to control not only access to technologically protected works, but also
ancillary technologies related to content protection., 24 Some commentators
have argued that the provisions create a right of access, in which the alleged
circumventor of a technological measure need not engage in any of the
traditional acts of infringement to violate the anti-circumvention
provisions.2 5 Whereas the constitutional basis for copyright states that it
must exist only for a limited time, the DMCA's grant of paracopyright
includes no such limitation.26
Among other things, the new Chapter 12 sanctions the right of
copyright holders to employ technological measures to protect access

27

to

their copyrighted work. It is a violation of the legislation to break the
access controls to gain entry to a copyrighted work.28 Further, it is also a
violation to traffic in devices designed for the primary purpose of

20

Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).

21 S. REP. No. 105-90, at 1-2 (1998).
22 See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 12A. 18[b]

(2003); see also Burk, supra note 2, at 1096.
23 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, at 24 (July 1998) (quoting a letter endorsed by copyright
law professors characterizing the anti-circumvention provisions as "paracopyright.").
24 Burk, supra note 2, at 1096.
25 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the "Digital Millennium, " 23
COLUM.-VLA J.L.& ARTS 137, 140-43 (1999).
26 The prohibition is tied to measures protecting works under copyright. Therefore,
when the work comes into the public domain, the prohibition on circumventing the access
controls would end. Nevertheless, the copyright holder is free to put technological
protection measures (TPMs) on works for as long as they want. Although the general public
is free to circumvent TPMs measures of public domain works, the reality is that the
prohibitions on trafficking in devices used to circumvent TPMs make it practically
impossible for most laypeople to be able to access public domain works that are protected by
TPMs. Likewise, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which a copyright holder may
combine a minute amount of new copyrighted material with a public domain work, thus
creating a new work protected under copyright (and thus protected under § 1201).
27 The DMCA does not define the term "access." When a term is undefined, it should
be given its ordinary, customary meaning. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994).
One court defined "access" as the "ability to enter, to obtain, or to make use of." Lexmark
Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D.Ky. 2003)
[hereinafter Lexmark 1].
28 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1) (1998).
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circumventing access control measures.29 Congress felt that the anticircumvention measures would encourage
copyright owners to make digital
30
works more readily available online.
In order to address concerns that fair use might be adversely affected,
Congress authorized the Librarian of Congress to create exemptions to the
prohibition for certain classes of copyrighted works. 3 1 The Copyright
Office engages in a rulemaking every three years to determine whether any
exemptions are warranted based on the evidence received in the rulemaking
proceeding. The first such exemptions were promulgated on October 28,
2000, with the latest round on October 27, 2003, after an almost year-long
comment period.
Whereas nowhere in the plain language of the statute does it state that
§ 1201 was intended to apply only to copyrighted works with an
independent economic significance,32 the legislative history suggests that it
was Congress' intention that the legislation be limited
to the digital
33
distribution of creative works such as movies and music.
B. Cases Interpreting§ 1201
Most of the early cases interpreting the anti-circumvention provisions
involved the content industries and traditional copyrighted works.34 As
such, these cases were of the type to which the DMCA was intended to
apply.
In Sony Computer EntertainmentAmerica, Inc. v. Gamemasters,35 the
Northern District of California determined that Gamemaster's "Game
Enhancer" product, which allowed PlayStation owners to bypass Sony's
authentication procedure and play import game cartridges that were not
licensed for the particular geographical region,36 circumvented a
technological measure intended to control access to copyrighted works.37
29 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(2) (1998). Obviously, the liability for trafficking cannot exist

without a violation of § 120 1(a)(1).
30S. REP. No. 105-190, at 8.
31 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1)(D) (1998).
32 Copyrighted works with an independence economic significance are creative works
produced by members of the content industry. Unless they have reverse engineering
aspirations, most consumers do not purchase garage door openers or toner cartridges for the
purpose of accessing the underlying computer program itself.
33
See infra Part IIIA.
34 See Higgs, supra note 8 at 65 (noting that the only previous case not involving a
content industry was PortionPacChem. Corp. v. Sanitech Sys., Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1302
(M.D.Fla. 2002), in which the court stated that "the DMCA was enacted ...to preserve
copyright enforcement in [sic] the Internet.").
35 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D.Cal. 1999).
36 Id.
37 id

at 987.

BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL

Vol 3:2

The court found that because the Game Enhancer seemed to have a primary
purpose of circumventing access controls, it was likely that the plaintiff
would prevail on its trafficking claim under § 1201 (a)(2)(A).3 8
In RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc.39 the plaintiff sought a
preliminary injunction to stop Streambox from distributing and marketing
products (the Streambox VCR, the Ripper, and the Ferret) which allowed
consumers to stream specially encoded digital audio and video files from
the Internet. 40
RealNetworks alleged that the products violated the
DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions.4'
Specifically, the software
bypassed the authentication sequence required for accessing the files and
allowed consumers to make unauthorized modifications of RealNetworks'
copyrighted software programs in order to access encoded RealAudio and
RealVideo files.42 Streambox argued that its product allowed consumers to
make fair use of works and non-infringing uses of works. The court found
that the Streambox VCR was likely to be a violation of both the "access"
and "copy" control anti-circumvention provisions (sections 1201 (a)(2) and
(b)), which prohibit developers from distributing products that circumvent
technological measures that prevent consumers from obtaining
unauthorized access to or making copies of copyrighted works.43 The court
enjoined distribution of the Streambox VCR. However, the court found that
the Ripper file conversion application has legitimate and commercially
significant uses, making it unlikely for RealNetworks to succeed on its
1201(b)(1)(A) or (B) claims.4 4
The next case focusing on the anti-circumvention provisions was
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,45 in which a group of movie studios
requested an injunction against the posting on the Internet of the DeCSS
computer program, which circumvented the CSS encryption system that
protects access to motion pictures on DVDs, allowing Linux OS users to
play DVDs without an authorized device driver.46 The Second Circuit
upheld the lower court's injunction, finding that the distribution of DeCSS
violated § 1201(a)(2)(A). 47
The first criminal case brought under the DMCA was United States v.

38 Id. at 989-991.
39

No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311 (W.D.Wash. Jan 18, 2000).

40 Id. at * 1.
41
42

id

Id at *4.

41 Id. at *8.
44 Id. at *10.
4' 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
46
Id. at 435-440.
47

Id. at 441.
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Elcom, Ltd.48 Willful violations of the anti-circumvention provisions "for
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain" give rise to
criminal liability. 49 In this case, the defendant sold software that eliminated
restrictions on copying and distribution from digitally formatted "ebooks. ' 50
The defendant was indicted by the grand jury on five counts, including
"four counts alleging circumvention offenses and aiding and abetting
circumvention offenses, under the DMCA, and a charge of conspiracy to
traffic in a circumvention program." 51
Although the government
maintained that distribution of the software violated the ban on trafficking
under § 120 1(b), 52 the jury acquitted the defendant.53
These cases all dealt with access controls that protect "goods whose
value lies in the copyrighted content they contain., 54 Given that the DMCA
was enacted to "make available via the Internet the movies, music,
software, and literary works that are the fruit of American creative
genius, 55 these are the types of cases that Congress envisioned would be
brought under the legislation. Even so, potential plaintiffs who hold a
copyright in a software program embedded in a functional object may
attempt to exploit the language of the DMCA to extend their monopoly.
II.
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE

DMCA

Recently, durable goods 56 manufacturers have attempted to extend the
anti-circumvention provisions from the digital piracy solutions envisioned
by Congress to grant a monopoly in the aftermarket parts industry.5 7 A pair

48

203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D.Cal. 2002).

49 17 U.S.C. §§ 1204(a)(1)-(2) (1998).
50 UnitedStates v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1118-19. "Ebook" is the term used

to describe a book in electronic format.
51 Electronic Frontier Foundation, US v. ElcomSoft & Sklyarov FAQ: Frequently
Asked Questions (and Answers) About the Dmitry Sklyarov & ElcomSoft Prosecution
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/USVElcomsoft/us
v-elcomsoft_faq.html.
52
Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
53 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 51; see also Higgs, supra note 8, at
67.
54 Higgs, supra note 8, at 67.
" S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
56 The phrase "durable goods" refers to "products that 'yield at flow of services into
the future' or that 'can be used over and over again."' Higgs, supra note 8 at 67-8; accord
Micheal S. Jacobs, Market Power Through Imperfect Information: The Staggering
Implications of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services and a Modest Proposalfor
Limiting Them, 52 MD. L. REv. 336, 364 (1993).
57 Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
[hereinafter Chamberlain II]; Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387
F.3d 522 (6th Cir. Oct. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Lexmark II].
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of cases resulted in conflicting decisions at the district court level 58 after
construction of the statute's language, clarifying a need for Congress to
intervene to avoid this problem. Specifically, in the case that denied
extension of the DMCA to durable goods at both the district and appellate
court levels, an amicus curiae59 argued that a finding in favor of the
plaintiff would extend the DMCA and eventually put an end to the
"aftermarket" remote controls industry, effectively stifling innovation and
raising prices for consumers.6 ° While a different appellate court ultimately
reversed one lower court's finding of a DMCA violation, the fact that an
injunction resulted in anti-competitive behavior for approximately 18
months demonstrates the court's relative difficulty in interpreting an
allegedly "clear" statute. Unless Congress revisits the anti-circumvention
provisions, courts applying strict construction of the statute may be forced
to extend application of the DMCA into areas unforeseen by the drafters of
the Act, resulting in an anti-competitive environment hostile to consumers.
A. ChamberlainGroup, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.
1. Background
Chamberlain Group, Inc. (Chamberlain) is the largest manufacturer of
garage door openers (GDOs) in the United States.61 Skylink Technologies,
Inc. (Skylink) manufactures and distributes a universal remote transmitter
("universal remote") capable of activating GDOs manufactured and sold by
Chamberlain and other manufacturers, including Chamberlain's Security+
opener. 62 Chamberlain sued Skylink, alleging inter alia that Skylink's
distribution of the universal remote provided
unauthorized access to its
63
Security+ line in violation of § 1201 (a)(2).
The Security+ GDO utilized a "rolling code" to engage the opener's
motor. 64

Chamberlain alleged that the Security+ was more secure than

standard GDOs because it utilized computer programs in both the remote
58 Lexmark 1, 253 F. Supp. 2d 943; Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., 292 F.

Supp 2d 1023 (N.D.1ll. 2003) [hereinafter Chamberlain1].
59 Brief of Consumers Union at 7, Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Techs.,
292 F. Supp 2d 1023,
http://www.eff.orgllegal/cases/Chamberlainv_ kylink/20040408_SkylinkAmicus_Brief.pdf.
60 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Judge Closes Door On DMCA Claims In
Case On Garage Remote Controls, Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Techs., 10 No. 16
Andrews Intell. Prop. Litig. Rep. 3 (2003).
61 ChamberlainI, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1030.
62
1d. at 1031.
63 Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045
(N.D.Il1. 2003) [hereinafter Chamberlain11].
64 ChamberlainI, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1026.
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transmitter and the receiver. 65 To sync with the program that engaged the
GDO's motor, the program on the remote transmitter generated both a fixed
identification number and a variable number.66 These numbers were
compared with numbers generated by the receiving program. 67 If the
numbers generated by the transmitter fell within the acceptable range of
values as determined by the receiving program, access to the program that
engaged the motor was granted, otherwise, access was denied.68
If a user were to inadvertently advance the rolling code past the upper
range of acceptable values, a foolproof measure known as
"resynchronization" would still allow the GDO to function properly. 69 The
user simply had to push the transmitter button twice and the receiver
software would compare the two signals and operate the GDO if the
variable values were separated by a factor of three.70 Skylink's universal
transmitter took advantage
of the resynchronization process to operate the
71
Security+ GDOs.

In its DMCA action against Skylink, Chamberlain claimed that the
"rolling code" was a technological measure that "effectively controls access
to a work," and that Skylink's universal remote circumvents the access
control mechanism. 72 Chamberlain requested summary judgment based on
its DMCA claims.73
2. District Court
Because neither the Seventh Circuit nor any district court in the
Seventh Circuit had ever considered 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), the District
Court treated the matter as one of first impression and underwent a detailed
analysis of Chamberlain's arguments and Skylink's defenses.74
The District Court began by examining the purpose behind Skylink's
universal remote. Skylink argued that it was not liable under § 1201(a)(2)
because the remote was not manufactured for the sole purpose of utilizing
the rolling code to operate Chamberlain's Security+ GDO, even though
Id. at 1027.
Id.
671d. at 1027-28.
68
1Id. at 1028.
69 Chamberlain I, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1028-29.
65
66

70

id.

71 Id. at

1032.
Id. at 1035.
73 id.
74 Chamberlain 111, 381 F.3d at 1185. In fact, as of the date of both the district court
case and the appeal, only the Second Circuit had construed §1201(a)(2), a construction that
focused on First Amendment issues rather than an application of the statute to case-specific
facts. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
75 Chamberlain 1, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
72
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admittedly one setting had no other purpose but to do just that.76 Skylink
further argued that a product that serves a legitimate purpose does not
violate sections 1201(a)(2)(A) or (B) of the DMCA.77 The court rejected
Skylink's argument, citing two cases applying the DMCA to digital piracy
in the content industry,78 stating that because one of the settings of
Skylink's transmitter served only the purpose of operating Chamberlain's
rolling code GDO, the fact that the remote serves more than one purpose is
not enough to defeat summary judgment.79
Amicus curiae Computer and Communications Industry Association
(CCIA) advocated that the court employ § 1201(f), the DMCA's reverse
engineering provision, as a basis for finding in favor of Skylink.8 °
Specifically, CCIA argued that Skylink did not violate the DMCA because
its actions fell within the safe harbor provision for reverse engineering for
the purpose of achieving interoperability. 8 1 The District Court commented
briefly on this argument but found an alternative basis on which to base a
finding for Skylink.82
The issue on which the summary judgment motion was ultimately
decided was whether a consumer's use of Skylink's transmitter was an
"authorized" 64act for purposes of the DMCA. 83 The DMCA defines
"circumvention of a technological measure" as "...avoid[ing], bypass[ing],
remov[ing], deactivat[ing], or impair[ing] a technological measure, without
the authority of the copyright owner."84
As such, whether the
circumvention was without the consent of the copyright owner constitutes a
separate element of the summary judgment motion. 85 Because consumers'
aftermarket options were not restricted by means of a shrinkwrap
agreement, as well as the long history of the universal replacement
transmitter market, Chamberlain implicitly gave its authority to consumers
to use any replacement transmitter.86 In doing so, Chamberlain gave both
Id.
Id. at 1037.
78Id.; citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), affid sub nom Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001)
(posting computer source code on the Internet that circumvents DVD access control
technology is a violation of section 1201 of the DMCA); RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox,
Inc,. No. 2:99CN02070, 2000 WL 127311 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (distributing software that
circumvents plaintiff's "secret handshake" process that controls access to copyrighted
materials is a violation of section 1201 of the DMCA).
79Chamberlain 1,292 F. Supp. 2d at 1037-38.
8oChamberlain 111, 381 F.3d at 1186 n5.
8 Id.at 1186.
82 Chamberlain 1,
292 F. Supp. 2d at 1035-36.
83 Id. at 1038-40.
76

77

84 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (1998) (emphasis added).
85 Chamberlain 1,292 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
86

Id. at 1038-40.
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consumers and competitors permission to circumvent access controls to
gain access to its copyrighted software.
The District Court further noted that under Chamberlain's literal
interpretation of the DMCA, a consumer would violate the anticircumvention provisions if he lost the transmitter and found some other
88
The court stated that
way to sidestep the rolling code to open his garage.
89
conclusion."
a
"the DMCA does not require such
The District Court denied Chamberlain's motion for summary
judgment on August 29, 2003, inviting Skylink to file for summary
13, 2003,91
judgment.90 The court granted Skylink's motion on November
92
prompting Chamberlain's appeal to the Federal Circuit.
3. FederalCircuit
Chamberlain did not appeal the denial of its summary judgment
motion on its DMCA claims.93 Rather, Chamberlain's appeal stemmed
"from its allegations that the District Court incorrectly construed the
DMCA as placing a burden upon Chamberlain to prove that the
circumvention of its technological measures enabled access to its
copyrighted software."94 Applying Seventh Circuit law,9 5 the Federal
Circuit affirmed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of Skylink,
concluding that because Skylink's transmitter enables only uses that
copyright law authorizes, "Chamberlain has neither proved nor alleged a
connection between Skylink's accused circumvention device and the
protections that the copyright laws afford Chamberlain capable of
overcoming [the] presumption" that Skylink's device is legal.96
87 id.
88

id.

at 1040. The district court failed to pinpoint where in the text of the DMCA it
found support for this conclusion.
90 Chamberlain1, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1040.
91Chamberlain11, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
92Chamberlain III, 381 F.3d at 1182. Although copyright law is not traditionally
within its jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit properly heard the case because both as filed and
as amended, the District Court's jurisdiction at least partly "arose under" patent laws. Id. at
1188.
89 Id.

9 Id. at 1181.
94

1d. at 1182.
95 Id. at 1191. As copyright law is not traditionally within its jurisdiction, to resolve
issues of substantive copyright law, the Federal Circuit applies the law as interpreted by the
regional circuit in which the case arose. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
975 F.2d 832, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The Chamberlaincase was essentially a matter of first
impression, as the Seventh Circuit had considered the DMCA only once, in In re Aimster
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003), although that case involved different
provisions of the DMCA than those at issue in Chamberlain.
96 Chamberlain111. 381 F.3d at 1191.

BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL

Vol 3:2

The court began by noting that it must "first determine precisely what
§ 1201(a)(2) prohibits" in order to determine whether Skylink was entitled
to summary judgment. 97 To interpret a statute, the court begins with the
language of the statute.9 8 If the statute is unambiguous, the court simply
"enforces the congressional intent embodied in that plain wording." 99
However, if the words of the statute are ambiguous or "do not yield at
satisfactory answer with respect to the intent of the congress, [the court]
must employ other less satisfactory means to ascertain, as best [they] can,
100
the legislative will."'
The Federal Circuit noted that the DMCA's anti-circumvention
provisions establish new causes of action for liability, not a new property
right.' 0 ' Circumvention is not infringement, a point made clear by the
statute's structure.10 2 The Federal Circuit stated that the distinction between
03
property and liability "goes straight to the issue of authorization."'
Whereas under copyright law, after a plaintiff shows that the defendant has
used his property, the burden is on the defendant to prove that the use was
authorized, 10 4 the DMCA defines circumvention as activity undertaken
"without the authority of the copyright owner.' 1 5 "The plain language of
the statute therefore requires a plaintiff alleging circumvention ( . . .) to
prove that the defendant's access was unauthorized."' 1 6 The court noted
that this was a "significant burden" where the copyright laws allow
consumers 0to7 use a copy of software embedded in a product they have
purchased.1
The court next noted that the divide between property and liability is
relevant to an important policy issue, namely antitrust and the doctrine of
copyright misuse.10 8 Chamberlain argued that the DMCA superseded
existing consumer beliefs about uses of products containing embedded
software and that in enacting the DMCA Congress empowered
97id.
98

Id. at 1192 (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484

U.S. 49, 56 (1987)).
99ChamberlainI1,381 F.3d at 1192 (citing United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 560
(1982)).
1ooChamberlain 111, 381 F.3d at 1192 (citing Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bush, 918
F.2d 1323, 1327 (7th Cir. 1990)).
O'Chamberlain111, 381 F.3dat 1192.
102 Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (1998) ("Nothing in this section shall affect right,
remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this
title.").
103 Chamberlain111, 381 F.3d at 1193.
1

04Id.

o0Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (1998).
"' ChamberlainI1,381 F.3d at 1193.
107 Id.

108 Id.
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manufacturers to prohibit consumers from using embedded software
products in connection with competing products.10 9 The court stated that
such an interpretation of the DMCA would grant manufacturers broad
exemptions from antitrust laws and the doctrine of copyright misuse, an
interpretation that would only be reasonable if § 1201 recognized a "new
property right capable of conflicting with the copyright owner's other legal
responsibilities." ' 0 The DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions do not
establish a new property right, but rather" provide property owners with
new ways to secure their property.""' Regarding the issue of implied
repeal of the antitrust laws, the court stated:
The Supreme Court has... "considered the issue.., in the context of a
variety of regulatory schemes and procedures. Certain axioms of
construction are now clearly established. Repeal of the antitrust laws
by implication is not favored and not to be casually allowed. Only
where there is a plain repugnancy' between
the antitrust and regulatory
2
provisions will repeal be implied." "1
The court stated that "no such 'plain repugnancy' separates the DMCA
from the antitrust laws." ' 1 3 Therefore, the DMCA does not limit the scope
of antitrust laws, either explicitly or implicitly."14
As to Chamberlain's DMCA claim, to prove a violation of
§ 1201(a)(2), the court stated that a plaintiff must prove:
(1) ownership of a valid copyright on a work, (2) effectively controlled
by a technological measure, which has been circumvented, (3) that
third parties can now access (4) without authorization, in a manner that
(5) infringes or facilitates infringing a right protected by the Copyright
Act, because of a product that (6) the defendant either (i) designed or
produced primarily for circumvention; (ii) made available despite only
limited commercial significance other than circumvention; or (iii)
marketed for use in circumvention of the controlling technological
measure. 115

Not only did Chamberlain fail to show that Skylink's access was not
authorized, but they also failed to show the fifth element of the DMCA
claim, "a critical nexus between access and protection." 116 Chamberlain
never showed how Skylink's access "facilitates the infringement of any

109

Id.

"ld.
"1 Chamberlain111, 381 F.3d at 1193-94.
112 Id. at 1201-02 (quoting Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 682
(1975)).
113

Chamberlain111, 381 F.3d at 1202.

114 id.
15 Id. at
16
1 Id. at

1203.
1204.
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right that the Copyright Act protects."" 7 Because Chamberlain's customers
are authorized by the Copyright Act to use the copy of copyrighted software
embedded in the GDO, the customers are protected from circumvention
liability. 1 8 If there is no copyright infringement and no prohibited
circumvention, then Skylink cannot possibly be liable for trafficking under
§1201(a)(2)." 9 Therefore,
Chamberlain cannot utilize §1201 to restrict
20
aftermarket options. 1
B. Lexmark International,Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.
Whereas the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain affirmed the lower
court's finding, that the defendant's garage door opener did not violate the
anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA, the Lexmark appellate court
vacated the lower court's decision for the plaintiff. That decision
stated... That the two district courts reached conflicting conclusions
demonstrates that the statutory language of the DMCA is ambiguous and
may have potentially anticompetitive results, as courts find it difficult to
parse the language and apply it to fact-specific situations. What are the
conflicting conclusions?
1. Background
Lexmark International, Inc, (Lexmark) is one of the largest players in
the laser printer market. 121 Lexmark offers consumers two choices-a full
price printer cartridge, and a discounted printer cartridge, whereby
consumers agree to return used cartridges to Lexmark for
remanufacturing1 22 The latter "Prebate" cartridge, which is used in two
models of Lexmark T-Series printers, contains a microchip containing a
copyrighted computer program, 123 the Toner Loading Program. 124 That
program monitors the amount of toner left in the cartridge. 125 The Printer
Engine Program, which resides in the printer itself, controls such operations

117id.
118 Chamberlain111,

381 F.3d at 1204.

119 Id.
120

id.

121 Lexmark I,
122

253 F. Supp. 2d at 946.

Id. at 947.

123 id.
124 The Sixth Circuit demonstrates the modest size of the program by indicating that
the phrase "Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc." in ASCII format
would occupy more memory than the Toner Loading Program. Lexmark I, 387 F.3d at 52930. In this case, the Toner Loading Program is the "technological measure" that controls
access to
25 the Printer Engine Program (the "copyrighted work").
1 Lexmarkl, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 949.
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as paper feed, motor control, and paper movement. 12 6 When a toner
cartridge is inserted in the printer, an authentication sequence is
activated. 27 If the code in the printer matches the code on the toner
cartridge microchip, the Printer Engine Program will work.1 28 The terms of
the Prebate agreement are thus enforced, because cartridges refurbished by
the copyright-protected
competitors do not contain the microchip, or 129
software, and will cause the printer to malfunction.
Static Control Components, Inc. (SCC) developed its SMARTEK
microchip to replace Lexmark's chip in the used Prebate cartridges.1 30 The
SMARTEK chip was sold to Lexmark's competitors in the aftermarket
printer supply business for use in refurbishing Prebate cartridges.' 3' By
circumventing the authentication sequence in the Lexmark printers, the
SMARTEK chip enabled the use of unauthorized cartridges.' 32 To ensure
that the SMARTEK chip would in fact enable unauthorized refurbished
SCC copied the Toner Loading
cartridges to work in Lexmark printers,
133
Program "in exact format and order."'
On December 20, 2002, Lexmark brought suit in the Eastern District
of Kentucky, and moved for a preliminary injunction against the making,
selling, and distribution of the SMARTEK chips. The complaint contained
three theories of liability: 1) "SCC violated the copyright statute . . . by
reproducing the Toner Loading Program on its SMARTEK chip;" 2) "SCC
violated the DMCA by selling a product that circumvents access controls on
the Toner Loading Program;" and 3) "SCC violated the DMCA by selling34a
product that circumvents access controls on the Printer Engine Program."'
2. District Court's analysis
The district court first determined that Lexmark was likely to succeed
121 Id. at 948.
127 Id. at 948-52.
128 Id.
29

1 Id. at 952.

130 Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4,
Lexmark (No. 02-571-KSF) ["SCC Opposition"].
131Lexmark 1, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
32

1 id.
33

1 Id. Although the District Court determined that SCC engaged in wholesale copying
of Lexmark's copyrighted program, the Copyright Office's recent rulemaking on exemptions
from the DMCA suggests that this crucial fact is still in dispute. See Marybeth Peters,
Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights in RM 2002-04: Rulemaking on Exemptions
from Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies 176 (Oct. 27, 2003), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/registers-recommendation.pdf; see also Higgs, supra

note 8, 3at4 n.86.

1 LexmarkII, 387 F.3d 522, 531(6th Cir. 2004).
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on the merits of its copyright infringement claim.' 35 SCC admitted that it
had engaged in literal copying of the Toner Loading Program when it
developed its SMARTEK microchip. 136 SCC argued that the Toner Loading
Program was a "lock-out code," thus rendering it uncopyrightable because
elements were dictated by functional compatibility constraints. 137 This
argument was rejected because "the use of any Toner Loading Program
could still result in a valid authentication sequence and a valid
checksum."' 38 Next, SCC raised the defense of copyright misuse, alleging
that Lexmark was attempting "to secure an exclusive right or limited
monopoly not expressly granted by copyright law.', 139 The court rejected
this defense, finding that Lexmark was merely protecting the right of
access, a 40legitimate right under the copyright law after the enactment of the
DMCA. 1

The court next determined that the DMCA claim was also likely to
prevail on the merits. 14 1 The court stated that the plain meaning of the
statute was clear and unambiguous, thus rendering a resort to legislative
history unnecessary. 142
Specifically, the court concluded that the
authentication sequence constituted a "technological measure" of the type
proscribed in § 1201(a) 'that "controls access" to the copyrighted Toner
Loading Program and Printer Engine Program. 143 The authentication
sequence "effectively" controlled access because it controlled "the
consumer's ability to make use of these programs."'"
Finally, the
SMARTEK microchip circumvented Lexmark's access controls by tricking
the printers into thinking that SCC's chips were actually those contained on
Lexmark's authorized cartridges. 145 The court thus concluded that the
SMARTEK chips' sole purpose was circumvention of technological
46
measures implemented to control access to copyrighted works. 1
The court then turned to SCC's defense that congressional intent was
for the DMCA to apply only to digital piracy rather than such an expansive
application of the statute. 147 The court rejected this argument, stating again
that because the language of the statute was clear, an examination of the
135 Lexmarkl, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 957.
116 Id. at 955.
13 7 Lexmark 11, 387 F.3d at 531.
138 Id.
9Lexmark 1, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
140

id.

141 Id. at

966-71.

141 Id. at 967.
141 Id. at 967-68.
144 Lexmark 1, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 968.
14 5 id.
146 id.

147 Id. at 969-70.
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legislative history would be inappropriate. 148 The court felt that the ban on
trafficking in anti-circumvention tools contained in §1201(b) was sufficient
to prevent digital piracy and that SCC's suggested reading would cause the
language in §1201(a)(2) to be "mere surplusage."' 149 The court went on to
point out that, as enacted, Congress did not limit application of the DMCA
to copyrighted works with independent market value.150 Specifically, the
DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions, as drafted, apply to all copyrighted
works, regardless of the subject matter of the work. 151
The court next dismissed SCC's claim that its actions fell under the
reverse engineering exception contained in section 1201(f) of the statute
because the SMARTEK chips contained literal copies of the Toner Loading
Program. 152 Although SCC had engaged in time-consuming, expensive
efforts to reverse engineer the Toner Loading Program and had ultimately
developed independently created software mimicking the authentication
sequence, SCC resorted to slavish copying of the Toner Loading Program.
The district court stated that "SCC's SMARTEK microchips cannot be
considered independently created computer programs. [They] serve no
legitimate purpose other than to circumvent Lexmark's authentication
sequence and .

.

. cannot qualify as independently created when they

contain exact copies of Lexmark's Toner Loading Program.' 1 53 Thus, the
Toner Loading Program did not fall within the reverse engineering
54
exception. 1
The district court granted the preliminary injunction on February 27,
2003. SCC appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit. However, before the
appeal was heard, SCC participated in the Copyright Office's anticircumvention rulemaking.
3. SCC petitionfor exemption in § 1201 rulemaking
Taking advantage of the fact that the Copyright Office was in the
process of reviewing petitions for exemptions of copyrighted works from
the anti-circumvention provisions, SCC submitted a late comment
proposing an exemption from liability for the following classes of works:
1. Computer programs embedded in computer printers and toner
14 8

id.

149 Lexmark

I, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 969.

150 id.
' Id. at 969-70.
152Id. at

970 ("Sections 1201(f)(2) and (3) of the DMCA are not broad exceptions that

can be employed to excuse any behavior that makes some device 'interoperable' with some
other device.").
113 ld. at 971.
154 Lexmarkl, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 970-71.
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cartridges and that control the interoperation and functions of the
printer and toner cartridge;
2. Computer programs embedded in a machine or product which cannot
be copied during the ordinary operation or use of the machine or
product; and
3. Computer programs embedded in a machine or product and that
control the operation of a machine or product connected thereto, but
that do not otherwise control the performance, display or reproduction
of copyrighted works that have an independent economic
significance.155
It was probably not SCC's hope that an exemption from liability might
render the litigation moot, but more likely to have additional ammunition to
use in court. Any possible exemption would not address the claims in the
suit.
The Register of Copyrights did not recommend exemptions from
liability for any of SCC's proposed classes of works. 56 The Register
concluded that achieving interoperability of remanufactured printer
cartridges with Lexmark's printers could have been lawfully achieved by
taking advantage of the defense found in § 1201(f), the reverse engineering
provision,157 as it was intended "to avoid hindering competition and
innovation in the computer and software industry."' 5 8 "Interoperability
necessarily includes . . . concerns for functionality and use, and not only ' of
59
individual use, but for enabling competitive choices in the marketplace."'
In fact, the Register went on to state:
Taking advantage of the statutory exemption found in §1201(f)
provides far greater relief to a competitor than could any recommended
exemption by the Librarian. An exemption for a particular class of
works in this rulemaking is limited to the prohibition in
§1201 (a)(1)(A). Pursuant to §1201 (a)(1)(E), neither an exemption nor
"any determination" made in this rulemaking "may be used as a
defense in any action to enforce any provision of this title other than
this paragraph." In sharp contrast, the statutory exemption found in
§1201(f) not only permits circumvention of technological measures to
'55
Petition of Static
Control
Components,
Inc.,
available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/petitions/index.html.
1
156 Marybeth Peters, Recommendations of the Register of Copyrights, pp. 72-83
(October 27, 2003), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/registers[hereinafter Register's Recommendations].
recommendation.pdf
57

1 1d. at 176.
15' Id. at 178

(quoting Staff of House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.,
Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 2281 as Passed by the United States House of
Representatives on Aug. 4. 1998 (Comm. Print 1998)).
159

Id.
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analyze and identify interoperable elements of a protected computer
program, but also provides exemptions to the trafficking provisions in
§ 1201 (a)(2) and 1201 (b). Even if the Register had found a factual basis
for an exemption, it would only exempt the act of circumvention. It
would not exempt the creation and distribution of the means to
circumvent or the distribution of interoperable computer programs
embedded in devices. Since it is clear that Static Control's goal was
not merely to privately circumvent, but rather to facilitate the
distribution of competitive toner cartridges to others, a recommendation
for an exemption in this rulemaking would have had little effect on the
intended use. On the other hand, if reverse engineering to achieve
interoperability is conducted under the statutory exemption, a
competitor may not only reverse engineer a computer program in order
to create an independently interoperable computer program, but may
also make the information or means of interoperability available to
others if the sole purpose is the enabling of interoperability of an
independently created computer program with other programs, to the
extent that doing so is a noninfringing use. Taking advantage of the
statutory exemption is, therefore, a far more robust remedy for insuring
60
competitive activity in the marketplace.'
The Copyright Office denied SCC's petition, but took no position on
whether SCC did in fact circumvent.
4. Sixth Circuit
On October 26, 2004, the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded the
district court decision. 61 The court held that the district court committed
three errors in determining that Lexmark had a likelihood of success on the
copyright infringement claim: (1) in concluding that "because the Toner
Loading Program could be written in a number of different ways," it was
copyrightable; (2) in deducing that the toner control program had sufficient
originality to obtain copyright protection; and (3) "in assessing whether the
Toner Loading Program functioned as a lock-out code.' 62 Further, the
court disagreed with the district court's conclusion on the DMCA claim.
With respect to the infringement claim, the court stated that
infringement is established when the plaintiff shows "(1) ownership of a
valid copyright in the computer program at issue . . . and (2) that the
defendant copied protectable elements of the work."' 163 The first prong of
the analysis "tests originality and non-functionality."' 164 The Supreme Court
has indicated that "[o]riginal... means only that the work was independently
at 180-81 (footnote omitted).
F.3d at 529-41.
112 Id. at 537-541.
163 Id. at 534 (citing Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)).
164 Lexmark11, 387 F.3d at 534.
160Id.

161LexmarkII, 387
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created by the author.. .and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity;"' 65 the work need not be novel. Even if the work is original, it
may not be copyrightable because "[i]n no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery ... .,,166 "The
second prong tests whether any copying occurred (a factual matter) and
whether the portions of the work copied were entitled to copyright
protection (a legal matter).' 6 7
The Sixth Circuit felt that it was error for the district court to conclude
that, because it could be written in different ways, the Toner Loading
Program was entitled to copyright protection. 68 Failing to consider
whether "external factors such as compatibility requirements, industry
standards, and efficiency" dictated the number of structures the Toner
Loading Program could take conflicts with Feist.169 "[T]he court must ask
of putting together the competing work are
whether the alternative 1 7ways
0
setting."
that
in
feasible
Next, with respect to the originality standard, "the court should ask
whether the ideas, methods of operation and facts of the program could
have been expressed in any form other than that chosen by the programmer,
taking into consideration the functionality, compatibility and efficiency
demanded of the program."' 17 1 Lexmark's expert testified that there were
several possible alternatives. SCC's expert, however, "concluded that
functionality and efficiency considerations precluded any material changes
to the Toner Loading Program."'' 72 Further, the court contended, the
alternatives proposed by Lexmark's expert amounted to different ideas or
ideas or methods. 73 Methods and
methods, rather than means of expressing
174
copyright.
ideas are not protectable by
Finally, "the district court erred in assessing whether the Toner
Loading Program functions as a lock-out code.' 75 The court indicated that
even if "the programming language, program size, and efficiency concerns
did not dictate the content of the Toner Loading Program, the fact that it
165

Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. at 345 (citing M. Nimmer & D.

Nimmer, Copyright §§ 2.01[A], [B] (1990)).
166 17 U.S.C. §102(b).
167 LexmarkI1, 387 F.3d at 534.
161
Id.at 538.
169 Id. at 537-38.
0
17
id.
171Id. at 539.
172Lexmark 11, 387
73

F.3d at 539.

' Id. at 540.
174Id.(citing Bateman v. Mneumonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1546 n.29 (11th Cir.

1996)).
"' Id.at *541.
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also functions as a lock-out code" makes it difficult for Lexmark to succeed
on its infringement claim. 176 The court further indicated that the
unchallenged testimony [of SCC's expert] that it would be
"computationally impossible" to modify the checksum value without
contextual information suffices to establish that the checksum operation
imposes a compatibility constraint in the most literal sense possible: if
any single byte of
the Toner Loading Program is altered, the printer
177
will not function.
Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that compatibility alone justified SCC's
literal copying.
The Sixth Circuit also disagreed with the district court's conclusion on
the DMCA claim. The district court employed the "ordinary, customary
'178
meaning" of "access ('the ability to enter, to obtain, or to make use of')
to find that "Lexmark's authentication sequence effectively 'controls
access' to the Printer Engine Program because it controls the consumer's
ability to make use of these programs."'' 79 The Sixth Circuit, on the other
hand, stated that it is the purchase of a Lexmark printer, rather than the
authentication sequence, that allows "access" because the literal code of the
Printer Engine Program may be read directly from the memory and the data
may be translated into source code. 180 Thus, "[n]o security device . ..
protects access to the Printer Engine Program Code and no security device
accordingly must be circumvented to obtain access to that program code."
The court pointed out that the authentication sequence may control the
consumer's ability to "make use of' the work but it does not prevent the
consumer from "obtaining" (which is another "conventional meaning" of
the word "access") a copy of the work.' 8' The DMCA requires that access
' 82
to a copyrighted work not only be controlled but controlled "effectively."'
The court states that "it seems clear that this [anti-circumvention] provision
that restricts one form
does not naturally extend to a technological measure
' 83
of access but leaves another route wide open."'
Due to an inability of Lexmark to establish of its likelihood of success
on its infringement or DMCA claims, the Sixth Circuit vacated the lower
court's preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further

176

id.

177 Lexmarkll, 387 F.3d at *542.
178Id. at 546 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 6 (10th ed.

1999)).

179 Id.(citing

D. Ct. Op. at 41).

180 Id.

Id.at 547.
182 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(2).
183 Lexmark 11, 387 F.3d at 547.
181
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III.
DISCUSSION

The Sixth Circuit reversed the Lexmark lower court's disposition of
the DMCA claim based on a different definition of the word "access." The
Chamberlain court, on the other hand, based its reasoning on an analysis of
"authorization." Both courts engaged in complicated legal and linguistic
gymnastics to arrive at their results, demonstrating that a DMCA analysis,
which should be straightforward based on the statute, is complicated and
fact-intensive.
Strict adherence to the language of the DMCA can
potentially result in enlarging the scope of copyright to gain a monopoly in
functional products, anti-competitive behavior dangerous to consumers.
Therefore, Congress should clarify the language to avoid future
complications.
A. Legislative Intent
85
The proper starting place for statutory analysis is the text itself.
"When a statute is unambiguous, resort to legislative history and policy
considerations is improper.' 1 6 However, when the statute is unclear or its
strict adherence produces absurd results, consulting the legislative history
can be invaluable
in determining the intent of Congress in enacting the
87
legislation. 1

The driving force behind passage of the DMCA was the lobbying
efforts of the content industries. The DMCA's legislative history reflects
Congress' focus on the digital distribution of creative works traditionally
covered by copyright.

88

Specifically,

the law must adapt in order to make digital networks safe places to
disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials

. . .

[T]his bill ...

184 Id.at 551.

185 United States v. Ron Pair Enters, 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (citing Landreth
Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985)).
t
186 In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc., 203 F.3d 986, 988 (6 " Cir. 2000). Those in the
"textualist school" favored by strict constructionists such as Justice Scalia hold that the role
of courts in interpreting statutes necessitates that legislative history must be ignored in
determining the intent of Congress; the meaning of the statute can be found in the text alone.
See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
187 See generally Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S.CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law
Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the
Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1998). One commentator notes,
that in analyzing the DMCA, he "could not do [his] job absent the authoritative committee
reports." Nimmer, Sweet and Sour, supra note 5, at 956.
188 See generally Bajalcaliev, supra note 8.
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provides this protection and creates the legal platform for launching the
global digital online marketplace for copyrighted works. It will also
make available via the Internet the movies, music, software, and
literary works that are the fruit of American creative genius.i19
The record in the Senate and the House of Representatives provides the
following general motivations for the DMCA's enactment: to encourage
trade in copyrighted works via the Internet; to make safe the dissemination
of copyrighted materials in the digital marketplace; to update American
copyright law to reflect the realities of the digital world; and the bring the
United States into compliance with the WIPO treaties.1 90
In both houses of Congress, the legislators were concerned about the
1 91
implications of the digital revolution on the content industry.
Specifically, there was a concern that the threat of piracy of copyrighted
works in digital format might cause many copyright holders to limit
availability of their works. Because of the ease of making a perfect copy of
a work in digital format, many copyright holders were reluctant to engage
in electronic commerce and digital reproductions. While the legislative
history is full of references to making the digital marketplace safe for the
distribution of music, movies, books, and software, nowhere does Congress
express a desire to protect durable goods manufacturers and give them the
ability to obtain a monopoly in aftermarket replacement parts. However,
the language of the statute itself is not192explicitly limited to digital piracy of
works with independent market value.
B. EvaluatingDMCA Legislation
At least one commentator has argued that the DMCA does not meet
the "four primary axioms of the ingredients that combine to form 'good'
laws."' 193 The four
criteria are: (1) coherence; (2) transparency; (3) reality;
194
and (4) breadth.
1. Coherence
In order for a law to be coherent, "its pieces should fit together, so that
it inclines in a unified direction." 195 Coherence demands consistency and

"9 S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
190 See generally Bajalcaliev, supra note 8.
191 Id.

192 Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1998).
193 David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1233,
1270 (2004) [hereinafter Nimmer, Codifying]. Professor Nimmer goes so far as to compare
the DMCA to "Jeremy Bentham's "nonsense on stilts." Id.at 1342.
194

Id. at 1270-1277.

195 Id.at 1270.
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1' 96
that all provisions of a law "fit together to form a seamless whole."
The DMCA does not meet the requirement of coherence. "It is subject
to endless contradictions and interpretive dead ends."' 97 The massive
legislation fails "to embody the chief goal that its congressional architects
ceaselessly proclaimed; namely, saving the country from the specter of a
pay-per-use world."' 98

2. Transparency
Legislation should be transparent, so that citizens are able to
reasonably comprehend what is required or prohibited.1 99 "A transparent
law clearly signals its readers to the domains of its application. 2 °0
The Chamberlain and Skylink cases suggest that the language of the
DMCA is not transparent. Although ultimately the Sixth Circuit and the
Federal Circuit both arrived at the conclusion that the DMCA did not apply,
these results were reached after a complicated, fact-intensive parsing of
words in the statute, "[dispelling]
any impression that [the DMCA]
20 1
succeeds at being transparent.,

3. Reality
Good legislation should "provide guidance as to real-world concerns,
not airy, speculative, and contingent phenomena."202032 It should be apparent
how the law applies to contemporary occurrences.
The DMCA as a whole fails to meet the test of reality. It is "unique by
regulating in 1998 activities that not only
had no existence then but which
204
today.
reality
no
have
to
still continue
4. Breadth

Broadly responsible legislation serves the community as a whole
rather than the narrow concerns of organized special interests. The
requirement of breadth "posits that Title 17 of the United States Code
should regulate affairs across the country. It condemns special-interest
legislation undertaken for the benefit of a privileged few rather than along

196 id.

97
1 Id. at
198

'

99

200

1343.

Nimmer, Codifying, supra note 193, at 1343.

Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1343.

201 Id.
202

Id. at 1275.
Nimmer, Codifying, supra note 193, at 1275.
2041d. at 1343.
203
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neutral lines for the citizenry as a whole. 2 °5
Entire portions of the DMCA were "crafted for the particular benefit
of named entities, with no pretense of serving the commonweal
generally., 20 6 Congress granted special dispensations to various groups
throughout the sweeping legislation.207 In fact, "Congress inserted the
longest portion
of section 1201 for the specific benefit of Macrovision
20 8
Corporation.,
C. § 1201 Rulemaking for exemptionsfrom liability
While the bill was being debated in Congress, the Commerce
Committee was afraid that the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA
might have a potential negative effect on fair use.2 09 As a result, Congress
adopted several fair use exceptions 210 and enacted a "fail-safe" provision,
§1201(a)(1)(D), which grants the Librarian of Congress, with the assistance
of a recommendation of the Register of Copyrights based upon the record
of a triennial rulemaking proceeding, the power to grant three year
exemptions for "non-infringing uses by persons who are users of a
copyrighted work [and] are, or likely to be, adversely affected by . . ." the
prohibitions of section 1201(a)(1)(A). 2 11 The Librarian of Congress
205 Id. at
2 6

1276.

° 1d. at 1343.
207 id.
208 Nimmer, Codifying, supra note 193, at 1343. (citing David Nimmer, Back From

the Future: A Proleptic Review, in

COPYRIGHT: SACRED TEXT, TECHNOLOGY AND THE

DMCA, 524-25 (2003) (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k))).
209 David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the DigitalMillennium Copyright Act, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 673, 723 (2000).

210 17 U.S.C. §1201(c)(1) (1998)("Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title); (c)(4)
("Nothing in this section shall enlarge or diminish any rights of free speech or the press for
activities using consumer electronics, telecommunications, or computing products"); (d)(1)
("A nonprofit library, archives, or education institution which gains access to a commercially
exploited copyrighted work solely in order to make a good faith determination of whether to
acquire a copy of that work for the sole purpose of engaging in conduct permitted under this
title shall not be in violation of subsection (a)(1)(A)... ");(e) (" . . . This section does not
prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, information security, or
intelligence activity of an officer, agent, or employee of the United States... ");(f)(1)
("Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), a person who has lawfully
obtained the right to use a copy of a computer program may circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a particular portion of that program for the sole
purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to
achieve interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs,
and that have not previously been readily available to the person engaging in the
circumvention, to the extend any such acts of identification and analysis do not constitute
infringement under this title."). However, the fair use exceptions delineated in the statute
have been criticized as shortsighted and narrow. See Samuelson, supra note 18, at 543.
211 Section 1201(a)(1)(A) (1998) only applies to individual acts of infringement. It
does not include the anti-trafficking provision, which is set out in section 1201 (a)(2).
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publishes any class of copyrighted works it feels should be exempted from
1201(a)(1)(A) protections. The anti-circumvention provisions do not apply
to that class of works for the following three-year period.2t 2
However, this is a limited remedy as exemptions are only granted
every three years.21 3 Technology rapidly changes; the latest generation
laptop computer is often obsolete six months after it was released. It is
therefore likely that advances in technology will outpace such infrequently
granted exemptions. Further, the parties seeking an exemption must
affirmatively petition; exemptions are not granted sua sponte. Also, the
decision that a "class of copyrighted works" is not covered still leaves the
issue as to whether the work involved in the litigation is part of the
exempted class to be resolved by the courts. Finally, because exemptions
necessarily refer to a class of works rather than actions, it is clear that the
rulemaking authority might not be the best means for clarifying statutory
ambiguity and avoiding anticompetitive results.
D. Copyright Misuse
Untrammeled use of technological access controls by durable goods
manufacturers readily morphs into anticompetitive abusive behavior. The
doctrine of misuse was developed by courts to curb inappropriate uses of
intellectual property. 1 4
Misuse is an equitable doctrine, with roots in the patent world, in
which a defendant in an infringement action may prevail if he can show, as
a defense, that the patent owner has attempted to extended his patent into
areas not protected by the governmental grant.21 5 Such conduct in early
cases often involved illegal tying arrangements, in which a patent holder
required consumers to purchase an unpatented good in connection with the
purchase or license of the patented product.2 16 Congress has since
statutorily scaled back some of the doctrine by including language directly
in the Patent Act itself,2 7 and has prohibited tying only where the tying
218
arrangement "meets the antitrust test of market power in the tying item.,
212 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B) (1998).
213See Kristin Brown, Digital Rights Management: Trafficking In Technology That
Can Be Used To Circumvent The Intellectual Property Clause, 40 HOus. L. REV. 803, 819

(2003).

214 See Burk, supra note 2, at 1114.
215 See generally 6-19 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04 (2001); see

also Burk, supranote 2, at 1114.
216 See generally Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed
Be the Tie?", 4 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1991); see also Burk, supra note 2, at 1115-16; see
also ROBERT C. MEGANTZ, TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT: DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING

EFFECTIVE LICENSING PROGRAMS 91-2 (2002).
217 35 U.S.C. §271(d) (2005).
218 Burk, supra note 2, at 1117.
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One scholar points out that although the misuse doctrine has been less
successful in recent years as a defense to patent infringement, "it has
experienced a somewhat surprising renaissance within the law of
copyright"2 19 and argues that this may be due to the increased use of
copyright to protect software, as software has functional aspects that are not
present in most works traditionally covered by copyright. 22 0 The seminal
case in the development of application of the misuse doctrine to copyright
law is Laserscomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds.221 There, the Fourth Circuit
held that it was copyright misuse for a software company to include terms
in a license that restricted licensees from independently developing a
competing product. 22 In PracticeManagementInformation Corporationv.
American Medical Association,2 3 the Ninth Circuit followed the Fourth
Circuit, holding that the American Medical Association offended public
policy by licensing its medical coding system in exchange for an agreement
not to use a competing system. 24 Several other circuit courts have also
accepted the copyright misuse doctrine.2 25 Some commentators argue that
extending the anti-circumvention provisions into the area of products where
copyrighted software is ancillary to the desirability of the product itself
constitutes misuse. 226
However, this judicially created doctrine's
boundaries remain blurred and the "exact border between copyright misuse
and antitrust remains particularly vague and controversial," 227 which may
lead to some courts' reluctance to extend misuse to circumvention.
E. Conclusion: Congress Should Revisit the DMCA
Despite the Sixth Circuit's recent decision vacating the lower court's
decision in Lexmark, Congress should revisit the anti-circumvention
provisions to clarify language that may potentially be used to stifle
competition. That the lower court had allowed the use of the DMCA to
protect a copyrighted work that was wholly functional and not separately
marketed 228 based on the "plain meaning" of the statute demonstrates the
219

Id. at 1124.

220

Id.

911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 979.
223 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997).
221

222

224

225

Id.

See e.g.., DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir.

1996); Bateman v. Mneumonics Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996); Data General Corp. v.
Grumman Systems Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); Qad inc. v. ALN Assocs.
Inc., 974 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1992).
Burk supra note 2, at 1135-36; Higgs, supra note 8, at 83.
227 Burk, supra note 2, at 1126.
228 Brief of Amicus Curiae of Law Professors at 7, Lexmark (No. 02-571- KSF), at
226

http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/20030213-LawProfessorsAmicus.pdf,

(Jan. 30, 2003).
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difficulty in employing traditional tools of construction in interpreting this
sweeping legislation. Although two circuits have now ruled against the
creeping extension of the DMCA into the durable goods aftermarkets, one
can foresee a future in which manufacturers include a small amount of
ancillary copyrighted software that prevents interoperability of replacement
parts or peripheral products in virtually every product, from "refrigerators
to carburetors to lathes to audio speakers, 229 thereby enlarging the scope of
the copyright. Such a scenario would result in restrictions on consumers'
ability to choose aftermarket replacement parts for their durable goods.
As early as 1979, concurring in the recommendations made by the
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU), the commission charged with studying the efficacy of extending
copyright protection to computer programs, copyright expert Professor
Melville B. Nimmer expressed concern for "open-ended copyright
protection for all computer software., 230 He suggested "a possible line of
demarcation which would distinguish between protectible and
nonprotectible software in a manner more consistent with limiting such
protection to the conventional copyright arena., 231 Professor Nimmer
"drew the distinction between purely utilitarian works, such as 'programs
which control the heating and air-conditioning in a building, or which
determine the flow of fuel in an engine, or which control traffic signals' as
being potentially beyond the scope of copyright protection." 232 Professor
Nimmer suggested that protection should be limited to "those computer
programs which
produce works which themselves qualify for copyright
233
protection.,

One expert suggests that the "roots for that situation [of copyright
holders obtaining effective control over the aftermarket for their products]
trace back ultimately to Congress' decision to embody CONTU's
recommendation that all computer code be subject to copyright
protection., 234 Professor Nimmer's 1979 suggestion of "drawing a
distinction between software that controls mechanical processes-'the flow
of fuel in an engine' as he invoked or, one might safely add, the opening of
229 Nimmer, Codifying, supra note 193, at 1373. Professor Nimmer goes on to say
that the products that "adventitiously happen to include computer chips...tomorrow will
undoubtedly embrace everything from dog food to facial tissues." Id.
230 National Commission of New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final
Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(1979) [hereinafter CONTU Report], at 26-27; see also Nimmer, Codifying, supra note 193,
at 1264.
231 CONTU Report, supra note 230, at 27.
232 See Nimmer, Codifying, supra note 193, at 1264 (quoting CONTU Report, supra
note 231).
233 CONTU Report, supra note 230.
234 Nimmer, Codifying, supra note 193, at 1373.
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a garage door-as opposed to use of a copyrighted work such as a database
or videogame ' 235 might have avoided any attempt to expand copyright
protection into protecting aftermarkets. Congress should take Professor
Nimmer's earlier suggestions to heart and limit the provisions concerning
technological protection measures to those that protect copyrighted works
with underlying independent value, a DVD containing a motion picture or a
CD containing sound recordings.
Despite the powerful lobby of the content industry, some in Congress
may already be ready to clarify the DMCA's language. In particular,
Representative Zoe Lofgren (D. Cal.) has stated that "[w]hen Congress
enacted the DMCA in 1998, it never intended to prohibit all users - even
technical restrictions to make nonlawful ones - from circumventing 236
infringing uses of purchased content.,
Congress will eventually need to revise the law, thereby narrowing its
application to those situations for which it was first intended, namely digital
piracy of creative works.237 Congress should insert language requiring the
underlying copyrighted works to have independent market value and that
the circumvention present a substantial threat that the underlying work will
be distributed in digital form without authorization of the copyright owner.
Finally, Congress could create an exemption for legitimate uses, including
those that would fall within the fair use defense.238 Amendment of the
statute would provide specific guidance to the courts and companies while
promoting competition in the marketplace. The limiting language would
bring the DMCA more in line with the stated objectives for its passage.

235

1d. at 1373-1374.
See Robert P. Taylor & Ethan B. Andelman, Anticircumvention Under The DMCA:
Do
We StandAfter 5 Years?, 764 Prac. L. Inst./Pat. 101 at 116-17 (2003).
Where
237 See generally Samuelson, supra note 18.
238See Samuelson, supra note 18, at 537-38.
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